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Although they differ significantly as texts, one 
cannot help but sense a repeated pattern in the titles 
of some recent Japanese horror films.1 Ring (dir. 
Nakata Hideo, 1998), Ring 2 (dir. Nakata Hideo, 
1999), Rasen (The Spiral, dir. Iida Jôji, 1998), 
Uzumaki (The Whirlpool, dir. Higuchinsky, 2000), 
Kairo (literally, “The Circuit,” dir. Kurosawa Kiyo-
shi, 2000)—they all evoke images of circularity, of 
a movement proceeding away and then returning, 
an endless repetition. This motif extends to the sto-
ries of these films themselves, their basic structure 
being that of repeated “attacks” brought on by the 
return of a monster 
that should be past, 
assaults that, it is 
intimated, will only 
continue in the 
future. Even a 
horror film such as 
Tomie (dir. Oikawa 
Ataru, 1999), which 
sports a common 
girl’s name as its 
nondescript title, is 
fundamentally a cir-
cular tale, as the 
beautiful temptress 
Tomie repeatedly 
dies only to be resurrected each time to once again 
lure men into committing murder, including her 
own—thus starting the tale again. Round objects 
abound in such films, from cylindrical wells to re-
volving tapes (the Ring films), from Uzumaki’s over-
load of spirals to the gas tank cap literally rolling 
towards death in Kairo. Mamiya in Cure, an amne-
siac mesmerist, in some ways becomes the epitome 
of the circular monster, branded on the back by 
roundish metal, continually repeating the question, 
“Who are you?” without ever accumulating that 
knowledge which should result in the end of such 
repetitions. With the more popular of these films 
sparking subsequent textual returns of their mon-
sters in sequels (as in the case of Ring and Tomie), 
it appears the circularity and repetition of recent 
Japanese horror is bound to come back again and 
again. It is such relationships between repetition, 
horror, cinema, and history that I want to sketch in 
this paper.
Part of this overflow of repetitions is a func-
tion of the genre. If the monster is the return 
of the repressed, as many have argued, it returns 
repeatedly both because repression is never com-
pletely successful 
and because that 
which is repressed is 
too transgressive to 
be completely free. 
Even early Holly-
wood horror, which 
promised the tri-
umph of order and 
reason in a conclu-
sion affirming the 
final defeat of the 
monster, the attrac-
tiveness of a Drac-
ula or the sympathy 
towards Franken-
stein’s monster—as well as the commercial success 
that fuels the industrial foundation of the repetitive 
formula that genre is—stimulated the desire for 
encountering the creature again. Post-Carrie tales 
foreground this desire by intimating the monster’s 
rise again in the last shot, a device used in Tomie, if 
not more brilliantly in Cure. W. H. Rockett has even 
defined the horror genre as oscillating on an almost 
circuitous route between satisfying the Aristotelian 
desire to effect order by explaining (showing, elim-
inating) the monster, and allowing it to terrorize us 
in off-screen space; letting us be reassured it’s only 
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a movie while also scaring the living daylights out 
of us.2 
In discussing Japanese horror generically, one 
can argue differences between the traditional Japa-
nese ghost story (kaidan) and the classic Western 
horror tale. The strong legacy of female monsters 
and the lack of an Enlightenment project to restore 
order and reason, coupled with animistic beliefs 
about death and a Buddhist cosmology, articulate 
the specificity of the old kaidan, ones which often 
provided the fodder for many early Japanese horror 
films. Yet repetition still structured much of the 
experience. From Oiwa in Yotsuya Kaidan to the 
ghost cats in the bakeneko films of Suzuki Sumiko 
and Irie Takako, the monsters were angry ghosts 
(onryô), women who died wronged by a brutal (and 
male) feudal order, but whose souls could not con-
tinue on (to paradise, to another life) because of their 
anger. Audiences enjoyed the return of these repressed 
monsters not only by viewing them time and again, 
but by supporting a cyclical exhibition schedule 
which, for a long time, played kaidan films in the 
hot summer months in order to send “chills” down 
viewers’ spines (or so the story goes). Contemporary 
urban legends with a horror twist, such as the ones 
told by school children about “Hanako of the Toilet” 
(which was eventually made into Matsuoka Jôji’s 
1995 Toire no Hanako), themselves are fueled by 
the endless repetition of story telling that constitutes 
such social forms of transmission. 
Recent horror films, with their share of onryô 
like the Ring-series’ Yamamura Sadako, definitely 
have their referential roots in such kaidan, to the 
point that some writers praise recent work for their 
“return” to Japanese horror traditions after a flirta-
tion in the 1980s with “Westernized” splatter films.3 
These are still often female ghosts, wronged in 
their lifetime, who return to wreck havoc, and 
share such common tropes as the long, straight but 
uncombed hair down about the face. The scale and 
structure of repetition has changed, however. While 
kaidan ghosts may have returned to the theater every 
summer, in each text, they were exorcised (taiji 
sareru) or simply disappeared, after having accom-
plished their revenge against a specific enemy. In 
many cases, they have been put to rest, allowed to 
proceed to the Buddhist paradise (jôbutsu suru), 
thus ending the cycle of that ghost with that film. In 
recent works, however, monsters like Sadako and 
Tomie have no specific enemy; like Mamiya, they 
seem to be challenging one and all. There thus seems 
to be no way to put them at ease; even when Sadako 
is laid to rest in the first Ring (when her body is 
finally found), her videotape still retains its power. 
Just as the end of Ring implies, the cycle of watching 
the video will continue, perhaps out of necessity 
(it being assumed that one must copy the tape and 
have another view it to save oneself), perpetuating 
the ring of people that the title in part connotes.
One could argue this difference in recent Japa-
nese horror is equivalent to that evident in Holly-
wood horror of the last twenty or thirty years, re-
presented by the work of George Romero, Toby 
Hooper, John Carpenter, and others (who do, it must 
be mentioned, have their admirers among Japanese 
film directors, for instance Kurosawa Kiyoshi). 
Whereas early horror films still promised a return of 
order and valorized the authorities fighting the mon-
ster, in the “paranoid” horror Andrew Tudor sees 
in recent cinema, “both the nature and the course of 
the threat are out of human control,” with no solu-
tion ensured.4 Not only are authorities discredited, 
the monster itself increasingly becomes associated 
with we, the “normal” people, manifesting our own 
internal horrors. While Bruce Kawin argues that 
the horror movie monster has always been an 
expression of our “inner monster,” such that the 
genre becomes a mythic means of facing up with 
our darker side,5 it is clear that recent horror makes 
such a confrontation often impossible to resolve.
Japanese horror has often made the monster, 
frequently a victim herself, as or even more sympa-
thetic than her victims. It is thus possible for audi-
ences to identify with her, to find one’s self in her, 
rather than with the “normal” people. This is often a 
process less of seeing our evil in the monster than 
of desiring a powerful monster to eliminate our 
ills for us. Kaneko Shûsuke, director of kaijû films 
like Gamera and such horror movies as Crossfire 
(2000), has made the misunderstood monster a 
central theme. Although both Gamera and Junko 
in Crossfire are fighting evil, those around them 
simply reject them as monsters, in part because they 
have powers that even they cannot fully control, 
and which sometimes lead to innocent deaths. The 
audience clearly identifies with Junko, to the point 
that it is normal society itself that is monstrous: it 
was the force that effectively created monsters like 
her by discriminating against and expelling those 
who are “other” from society (the film states that her 
powers of pyrokinesis are a result of the pent-up 
anger of her ostracized ancestors). Kaneko, how-
ever, still relies on conventional divisions of self 
versus other in his strategy of identification, only 
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perversely reversing who “we” are in a manner that 
only re-disguises the real problem of others in Jap-
anese society. A film like Cure is more radical to 
the degree it renders the divisions between self and 
other, “us” and the monster—and thus the process 
of identification—fundamentally impossible.
Recent Japanese horror films repeat in part 
because contemporary society seems either inca-
pable of containing such disorder, or—and this is 
probably why it is incapable—has utterly failed to 
stop perpetuating the injustices that create such 
monsters in the first place. But in these days of polit-
ical ambiguity, when much of Japanese commercial 
cinema refrains from pointed critique, this concept 
of a politicized monster seems an insufficient inter-
pretation. This suspicion is supported by the recog-
nition that circularity and repetition function prom-
inently in Japanese non-horror cinema as well. Just 
to name a few: there are Kitano Takeshi’s films, 
Boiling Point (1990), Kids Return (1996), and Kiku-
jiro (1999), which are framed by scenes repeated 
almost exactly; the two entries in Kurosawa Kiyo-
shi’s Katte ni shiyagare series that use the identical 
opening scene; Aoyama Shinji’s imperative in 
Eureka (2000) to have his characters return to the 
origin of their trauma, take “another bus,” and only 
stop repeated murders through deciding to continue 
circling about on a bicycle and not turn off to kill 
again. In another example, Iwai Shunji’s Love Letter 
(1995) is replete with doublings and repetitions: 
two Fujii Itsukis are crisscrossed by two identical 
women (the female Itsuki and Hiroko), and the 
plot is partially centered on the repetition of a high 
fever on a snowy day. Even Hirayama Hideyuki’s 
Turn (2001) seems to repeat (unintentionally) the 
Bill Murray vehicle Groundhog’s Day in having 
the central character redo the same day over and 
over again, albeit in a different manner.
Repetitions are clearly a part of any narrative 
process, as the return of similar items and moments 
emphasizes story and character information, ensures 
narrative comprehension, establishes thematic 
motifs, and helps found the semiotic structure of the 
work. Gilles Deleuze, however, argues that repeti-
tion can, in certain forms, manifest a transgressive 
philosophy that questions the basis of Western En-
lightenment. He identifies two forms of repetition. 
One, a sort of “Platonic” mode, is repetition of the 
same, in which the two elements in the repetition are 
identical according to a general concept. Identity 
is at the basis of this world, and it is this fundamental 
identity that allows one to connect two elements. 
This, to Deleuze, is the model of representation, 
where similarity is allowed on the basis of an origi-
nal concept that ensures identity of meaning. The 
second, more Nietzschean form of repetition, how-
ever, is repetition of difference: the two elements 
are fundamentally singular (different) in nature, 
but are united in that difference through a univer-
sality that does not eliminate difference through the 
concept. Difference then founds this world, to the 
point that repetition is not the representation of an 
original, but the repetition of difference without an 
origin. Thus, instead of representation, repetition 
here founds simulacra, doublings and returns with-
out a solid “first.”6 To Deleuze, these two forms 
of repetition, while opposed, are always also inter-
twined, each involving and implying the other.
Deleuze, who claims for repetition a fundamen-
tal theatricality (a performance, with masks mask-
ing masks), associates true, Nietzschean repetition 
in art most closely to humor. But what is interesting 
for our purpose is the fact that his notion of the sim-
ulacrum as essentially a “phantasm” (the fact there 
is “something ghostly,” in J. Hillis Miller’s words, 
about the connections between these singular, dif-
ferent elements) leads us to ask whether it is not in 
fact horror that is the genre of true repetition. Not 
only does Deleuze cite doppelgänger as examples 
of true repetition, he relates that repetition to the 
death wish, such that the “death instinct must be 
understood in terms of [giving] repetition . . . an 
immanent meaning in which terror is closely min-
gled with the movement of selection and freedom.”7 
If simulacra are the denial of the principle of identity 
(A=A), we can speculate whether it is not horror, 
often populated with figures who seem to be them-
selves yet are somehow not themselves (the “pod 
people” in Invasion of the Body Snatchers, Yôichi 
in Ring 2, etc.), that persistently explores the oppo-
site of identity (A=not A).
It is tempting to use these conceptions to con-
sider the proliferation of repetition in recent Japa-
nese film as a marker of the postmodern moment, 
and in fact quite a number of films make contempo-
rary image technology, if not the floating signifier 
itself, a medium of terror. Kawin has argued that 
generically horror, because it is an occasion where 
we willingly see what we usually don’t want to see 
willingly, is often self-reflexive, reminding us of 
the processes of seeing and submitting to illusion.8 
Some Japanese horror films focus this self-reflection 
on the problem of image repetition.  The phenomena 
of “ghost photographs” (yûrei shashin), cited quite 
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commonly in contemporary popular culture and in 
the Ring-series, may indicate both a desire to restore 
a phantasmic aura to reproductive technology as 
well as a fear, with video and computer image 
devices, of new technology whose logic remains 
mysterious to many, but they also foreground that 
which is “ghostly” about reproduction: having two 
singular entities (say a person and a photograph) 
be the same yet different, the ghost itself marking 
the difference that identity cannot efface because 
that difference in fact founds identity.  
Ring’s primary “ghost photograph”—Sadako’s 
videotape—is then, in Deleuze’s terms, not an issue 
of representation but of simulacra. It is not impos-
sible to argue that the tape has an origin or referent 
in Sadako’s anger or onnen, and clearly there are 
marked moments in the series when the characters 
encounter the places “in reality” that appeared in the 
video. But these phantasmic accounts of origin are 
far from the common conception of representation 
based in identity. The video was created by means 
that deny the scientific basis of the medium, a point 
paradoxically emphasized by Ring 2, in which sci-
entific test subjects “reproduce” through mental 
“transmission” the tape images they had not neces-
sarily seen. They are essentially, to them, signs with-
out any referents. The Ring-series then elides the 
“original” moment of representation for the repet-
itive process of reproduction, symbolized by the 
video itself, which promotes its own propagation. 
It assumes the form of a technological urban 
legend, spreading through town, appearing on your 
shelf without you being sure where you got it, and 
becoming common knowledge without anyone 
knowing where it came from. “Ring” itself can thus 
refer to the endless process of making copies of 
copies, of images repeating images—and thus to the 
logic of the simulacrum. In some cases, such as the 
scene Mai experiences in the island inn in Ring 2, 
what was the video has become “reality,” leaving 
the line between image and reality unclear. In Kairo, 
Kurosawa performs this feat more adeptly, using 
image glitches (like those visible on a video skip-
ping) to not only signify the world of the dead on 
the net, but also, at unexpected moments, to turn 
spaces we thought “real” into computer images, 
evoking the spread of the simulacrum.
This is a process in difference, a fact under-
lined by the contradictory textuality of the Ring- 
texts themselves. Ring is a resounding example of 
textual repetition: not only was there a Ring novel, a 
Ring TV movie (before Nakata’s film), and a Ring 
TV series (aired in time for Ring 2), but more impor-
tantly, all have significant plot differences even 
though they treat essentially the same story.  These 
discrepancies are echoed by the two film sequels to 
the film Ring, Rasen and Ring 2, which both start 
off at the same point (Takayama’s death) and move 
off in completely different directions. Yet all are, in 
a sense, repetitions of Ring—a ring for which it is 
less and less clear where the original is.
Whether one interprets this state as Baudril-
lard’s all-encompassing simulacrum or Deleuze’s 
liberatory critique of Platonic identity, it is clear that 
Japanese contemporary horror is imbricated in the 
historical moment of postmodernism. Yet as such, I 
would argue that many of these films, either con-
sciously or unconsciously locating horror in the post-
modern condition, render repetition itself a complex 
site of contestation over the potential of cinema in 
history. Consider the moment in Tomie when Tomie, 
confronting Tsukiko, chides her on her future of 
marrying “that boring boy, having stupid kids, and 
turning into a wrinkled granny.” This she contrasts 
to her own existence of being perpetually young. It 
is, of course, an ironic comment, one not lost on 
Tomie herself, since her eternal youth is conditioned 
on her being repeatedly murdered and reborn from 
her body parts. In her own words, she is thus forever 
kawaii (cute, pretty) and kawaisô (pitiful), mani-
festing the present day tendencies of these related 
words. In some sense, she is the epitome of the shôjo 
(a young girl who is of reproductive age but through 
social convention remains unmarried), that figure 
which so represents the consumerist, unproductive 
trend in contemporary Japanese culture that anthro-
pologist Ôtsuka Eiji has named shôjo “the ‘common 
people’ [jômin] of today’s Japan.”9 Manifested in the 
“cute culture” (kawaii bunka) that dominated the 
1980s, shôjo, to Sharon Kinsella, are a form of social 
resistance, women consuming cute things in order 
to construct a space of innocent cuteness that funda-
mentally rejects the restrictions of both adulthood 
in general and womanhood in particular.10 It is much 
like Tomie’s eternal youth, or a kind of return to 
the pre-Oedipal stage before difference and gender. 
Helping us suggest an alignment between the shôjo 
and Deleuzian repetition, John Whittier Treat even 
convincingly relates the concept to Deleuze’s Anti-
Oedipus.11 In several aspects, the shôjo is a central 
symbol of facets of consumerist, postmodern Japan.
Tomie could be seen as the demonization of 
the shôjo, a reactionary backlash against the trans-
gressions of “normal” life cycles and womanhood 
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Tomie represents. This does remind us of the con-
servative roles horror as a genre can play, but in this 
case, we must recall the historical culture of repeti-
tion with which Tomie and the shôjo intersect. When 
Tomie confronts Tsukiko at the end with their 
similarity, declaring “I am you and you are me,” 
this not only acknowledges the shôjo in all of us 
consumers, but also recalls Ôbayashi Nobuhiko’s 
Exchange Students (“Tenkôsei,” 1982), which fea-
tures almost the exact same line. These words are 
spoken at a moment of despair by Saitô Kazumi, 
a middle school girl who, after rolling down some 
stairs with a classmate named Saitô Kazuo, ends 
up changing bodies with him, and are directed 
at Kazuo. The aim behind them, unlike in Tomie 
(where they express Tomie’s assertive presence), is 
to reassure, not simply by proclaiming togetherness, 
but by denying the distinction between self and 
other itself. From a director who has consistently 
filmed shôjo (even turning the castrator Abe Sada 
into a shôjo in his 1998 Sada), it is a particularly 
shôjo moment, one that reverberates in a tale replete 
with repetition (their similar names, the repeated 
action of falling down the stairs, etc.).  
We must emphasize the story’s pleasure, steeped 
as it is in a constructed nostalgia, but one firmly 
related to a structuring narcissism, manifested in 
these two “me’s” falling in love. The fact that this nar-
cissism, in Ôbayashi, is distinctly pre-Oedipal is con-
firmed in the later Miss Lonely (“Sabishinbô,” 1985), 
in which a teenage boy essentially falls in love with 
his mother (who appears out of a photograph as a 
girl his age), loses her, then marries another girl who 
looks just like her, finally to father another girl with 
the same visage. Here sweet circles of repetition 
envelop us in a comforting narcissism that recalls 
the union with the mother. The doublings in Iwai 
Shunji’s Love Letter produce a similarly soothing 
narcissism from another source: as Hikoe Tomohiro 
argues, it is based in a melancholic refusal to let go 
of the lost other, as even the words Hiroko shouts to 
her dead lover at the mountain at the end—“Are you 
well?”—still assume he is alive.12
My point is that Tomie, as well as other recent 
Japanese horror films, do not simply demonize the 
shôjo, but bear a potential critique of a particular 
historical articulation of the shôjo (and the post-
modern) that has, through repetition, created a nar-
cissistic elision of the other. This is evident from the 
fact that the elided other returns with a vengeance in 
these films. At the end of Tomie, the monster most 
appropriately reappears in a mirror alongside the 
heroine. A mirror image also features prominently 
in Sadako’s video, and even provides Mai a point in 
Ring 2 to “mistake” herself for Sadako’s mother (thus 
complicating her new motherly role towards the 
Sadako-ized Yôichi). Such mirrors remind us of the 
similarity between heroine and monster, but they also 
demonize narcissism itself, foregrounding the under-
side to that reflective celebration of the same. The 
potential exists for them to be read as a critique of 
a certain culture of repetition, one founded in con-
sumerist narcissism, but still, I would argue, only a 
potential. With too many films sticking closely to the 
demonization of the other central to the horror genre, 
they allow that other space to scream out—again 
and again in a structure of repetition—while never 
fully coming to terms with the self’s own perception 
of the other as a threat.
Kurosawa’s Cure and Kairo are more radical 
alternatives precisely to the degree that they and 
their use of repetition rework the genre itself. First, 
it is significant that in both films, the monster never 
really attacks. In Cure, all the murders are commit-
ted by the “victims” themselves, and it is arguable 
that all Mamiya did was to hypnotically prompt 
them, as in the case of the police officer or the doctor, 
to act out what they had always desired. In Kairo, 
Kurosawa makes it clear that horror is a matter of 
desire: there again, the figure of Death that emerges 
on the internet does not assault people, but begins 
with a question, “Do you want to see a ghost?”—a 
question like that posed by any horror film. People 
in Kairo do not die because Death kills them (most 
in fact survive their encounters with the dead), but 
because essentially they want to die. The threat, in 
effect, is of their own making. This is evident in the 
case of Harue, who not only willfully returns alone 
to her room, knowing full well the dangers, but 
“hugs” her Reaper as if greeting an old lover. Since 
this “lover” is invisible to us—visually, she is just 
hugging the camera—the death instinct is here 
closely tied to narcissism, too.
Earlier comments by Harue show that this 
moment does not simply illustrate the emptiness 
of narcissism, it also elaborates the historical logic 
behind this compulsion with death. Her declared 
fear that death is just the eternal continuation (dare 
we say, repetition?) of the loneliness she feels now, 
marks her demise as both an attempt to change that 
through a state of self-sufficient self-love, and con-
versely, a recognition that she has essentially been 
dead all along. The latter echoes the sociologist 
Miyadai Shinji’s argument that contemporary Japan 
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to many young people is nothing other than the 
horror of an “endless everyday” (owarinaki nichijô) 
where all is empty and nothing changes.13 Perhaps 
it is the prospect of this kind of eternal return (not 
the Nietzschean one) that leads them towards death, 
either self-inflicted or directed at others (as in the 
Sarin gas attacks or the 1995 Sakakibara case of a 
teenager decapitating his 9-year-old playmate).
Kurosawa also focuses the problem in the 
relationship of self and other, a point that is stressed 
in what could be called Kairo’s curious double, 
Barren Illusion (“Ôinaru genei,” 1999). Both are 
essentially apocalyptic films with heroines named 
Michi that make the fading out of the self a central 
issue. In Barren Illusion, this loss of self partly 
stems from the absence of a significant other, as 
Haru literally fades out at the beginning when other 
people reject him, but in both films, Kurosawa 
emphasizes that having an other is not enough 
(Ryôsuke in Kairo, after all, fades away at the end 
even when accompanied by Michi). Like the dots 
on the computer screen in Harue’s lab, the point is 
to be near the other without getting too close (which 
might result in absorbing the other, thus ending 
the self). In Cure, Sakuma’s warning to Takabe, 
the detective who wants to have an explanation 
for every crime, is precisely not to get too close, 
since some actions simply cannot be explained. 
The crimes Mamiya incites are essentially acts of 
crossing out the other (the X’s cut into the victims), 
actions which result in virtual self-destruction. 
Mamiya, as the monster without a self, is then the 
return of the repressed other who confronts people 
not only with their elimination of others, but also, 
with his seemingly unanswerable questions of 
“Who are you?”, with their fundamental emptiness, 
which is perhaps the most terrifying realization.
Kurosawa’s horror uses circularity and repe-
tition to emphasize this emptiness, foregrounding 
what many other horror films can only express 
unconsciously. The brilliant and frightening quality 
of his work, moreover, lies in its ability to 
render that emptiness both horrific and pleasurable. 
Mamiya, as Sakuma says, is less a monster than a 
missionary (dendôshi), a preacher offering the 
gospel of a new, wonderfully empty existence. It 
is a message that Takabe eventually accepts, at the 
price of killing his others (Mamiya, and probably 
his wife and Sakuma), yet without the loss of 
memory or sociability. There is something very tempt-
ing about that emptiness, a pleasure not unrelated 
to the pleasure of feigned plenitude for the shôjo, 
but Kurosawa skillfully makes fear part and parcel 
of that enjoyment, like a critical presence lurking 
behind our ideologized fun.
Quite appropriately, Cure ends with repetition. 
The last scene begins with Takabe sitting in the 
family restaurant, seemingly reprising a shot we had 
viewed earlier. The mise-en-scène and lines are 
largely repeated, but there is something ghostly dif-
ferent. We feel this is not the same Takabe as before 
(Takabe=not Takabe), yet given the illusory quality 
of many of the previous scenes (the wife’s body, the 
abandoned building where Mamiya is shot), we are 
not even sure of that. Even the subsequent reverse 
shot, which abruptly ends with the waitress picking 
up the knife, does not provide us with confirmation 
of our suspicion she will kill her boss. It is in the 
empty spaces between these shots, the gaps between 
these repetitions, that Kurosawa’s horror lies. It is 
both fearful and pleasurable, the horror and thrills of 
repetition and of cinema in contemporary Japan.
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